Updates tagged with infosec on Hacker Poesy!
lnxw48a1: Oh, wonderful. A #Zero-day with #RCE on #Windows ... currently unpatched. See: https://freeradical.zone/@tek/103874683857159931 #security #infosec
lnxw48a1's status on Monday, 23-Mar-2020 18:34:00 EDT
Oh, wonderful. A #Zero-day with #RCE on #Windows ... currently unpatched. See: https://freeradical.zone/@tek/103874683857159931 #security #infosec
lnxw48a1: RT @tek@freeradical.zone I have an awesome friend at Code for America, a non-profit based in SF (with some remote positions) that helps government better serve its people. They're working currently in safety net services, criminal justice reform, and easing the EITC participation gap.They're also currently hiring for security engineers:- http://status.hackerposse.com/url/19974 https://nu.federati.net/notice/3242455
lnxw48a1's status on Tuesday, 21-Jan-2020 17:32:14 EST
RT @tek@freeradical.zone I have an awesome friend at Code for America, a non-profit based in SF (with some remote positions) that helps government better serve its people. They're working currently in safety net services, criminal justice reform, and easing the EITC participation gap.They're also currently hiring for security engineers:- http://status.hackerposse.com/url/19974 …
tek: I have an awesome friend at Code for America, a non-profit based in SF (with some remote positions) that helps government better serve its people. They're working currently in safety net services, criminal justice reform, and easing the EITC participation gap.They're also currently hiring for security engineers:- http://status.hackerposse.com/url/19971 h https://freeradical.zone/users/tek/statuses/103523653264719091
tek's status on Tuesday, 21-Jan-2020 17:26:28 EST
I have an awesome friend at Code for America, a non-profit based in SF (with some remote positions) that helps government better serve its people. They're working currently in safety net services, criminal justice reform, and easing the EITC participation gap.They're also currently hiring for security engineers:- http://status.hackerposse.com/url/19971 h…
rozzin: Conversations with kids, about #umwelt, #superpowers, and #infosec: "Why are they looking at me?" "Because they heard you fart." "Whhhhat do you mean?!?!" "Hearing people can hear farts." … https://www.jwz.org/blog/2018/11/tell-them-to-stop-listening-to-my-farts/ !education !parenting #poop !security
rozzin's status on Wednesday, 21-Nov-2018 13:55:42 EST
Conversations with kids, about #umwelt, #superpowers, and #infosec: "Why are they looking at me?" "Because they heard you fart." "Whhhhat do you mean?!?!" "Hearing people can hear farts." … https://www.jwz.org/blog/2018/11/tell-them-to-stop-listening-to-my-farts/ !education !parenting #poop !security
mmn: RT @rysiek With all my gripes with# Signal (centralized, non-federated, server-based, Electron-based desktop app), the fact that in my circle of contacts it's not longer the "pretty good solution we should be using" but the "pretty good solution we are using but looking for something better" is such a win.I just wanted to stop for a second and appreciate that.If we're https://social.umeahackerspace.se/notice/2059751
mmn's status on Thursday, 24-May-2018 01:48:55 EDT
RT @rysiek With all my gripes with# Signal (centralized, non-federated, server-based, Electron-based desktop app), the fact that in my circle of contacts it's not longer the "pretty good solution we should be using" but the "pretty good solution we are using but looking for something better" is such a win.I just wanted to stop for a second and appreciate that.If we're…
rysiek: With all my gripes with# Signal (centralized, non-federated, server-based, Electron-based desktop app), the fact that in my circle of contacts it's not longer the "pretty good solution we should be using" but the "pretty good solution we are using but looking for something better" is such a win.I just wanted to stop for a second and appreciate that.If we're talking https://mastodon.social/@rysiek/100079817104921655
rysiek's status on Wednesday, 23-May-2018 13:33:38 EDT
With all my gripes with# Signal (centralized, non-federated, server-based, Electron-based desktop app), the fact that in my circle of contacts it's not longer the "pretty good solution we should be using" but the "pretty good solution we are using but looking for something better" is such a win.I just wanted to stop for a second and appreciate that.If we're talking …
mmn: RT @rysiek Oh boy. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Desktop/issues/1635tl;dr Signal Desktop is based on Electron, which in turn is based on Chromium 58-59, and it seems to be affected by bugs that have been fixed in Chrome/Chromium 60-62.Gotta love #Electron. As somebody said "now everyone is running 5 different instances of old insecure versions of the most scrutinized and attacked application on Earth."#InfoSec
mmn's status on Wednesday, 16-May-2018 09:20:24 EDT
RT @rysiek Oh boy. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Desktop/issues/1635tl;dr Signal Desktop is based on Electron, which in turn is based on Chromium 58-59, and it seems to be affected by bugs that have been fixed in Chrome/Chromium 60-62.Gotta love #Electron. As somebody said "now everyone is running 5 different instances of old insecure versions of the most scrutinized and attacked application on Earth."#InfoSec
rysiek: Oh boy. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Desktop/issues/1635tl;dr Signal Desktop is based on Electron, which in turn is based on Chromium 58-59, and it seems to be affected by bugs that have been fixed in Chrome/Chromium 60-62.Gotta love #Electron. As somebody said "now everyone is running 5 different instances of old insecure versions of the most scrutinized and attacked application on Earth."#InfoSec
rysiek's status on Saturday, 12-May-2018 08:56:59 EDT
Oh boy. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Desktop/issues/1635 tl;dr Signal Desktop is based on Electron, which in turn is based on Chromium 58-59, and it seems to be affected by bugs that have been fixed in Chrome/Chromium 60-62. Gotta love #Electron. As somebody said "now everyone is running 5 different instances of old insecure versions of the most scrutinized and attacked application on Earth." #InfoSec
kaveh: Automated Twitter phishing tool. https://github.com/omergunal/PoT !infosec !security
kaveh's status on Friday, 23-Feb-2018 07:42:32 EST
Automated Twitter phishing tool. https://github.com/omergunal/PoT !infosec !security
kaveh: PinMe, a novel user-location mechanism that exploits non-sensory/sensory data stored on the smartphone, e.g., the environment's air pressure, along with publicly-available auxiliary information, e.g., elevation maps, to estimate the user's location when all location services, e.g., GPS, are turned off. https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.01468 !infosec !security
kaveh's status on Friday, 23-Feb-2018 07:33:26 EST
PinMe, a novel user-location mechanism that exploits non-sensory/sensory data stored on the smartphone, e.g., the environment's air pressure, along with publicly-available auxiliary information, e.g., elevation maps, to estimate the user's location when all location services, e.g., GPS, are turned off. https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.01468 !infosec !security
kaveh: SSH-Audit, checks your SSH config and suggests improvements.https://github.com/arthepsy/ssh-audit !infosec !security
kaveh's status on Friday, 16-Feb-2018 14:37:43 EST
SSH-Audit, checks your SSH config and suggests improvements. https://github.com/arthepsy/ssh-audit !infosec !security
kaveh: What will the warrior-guardian of the future look like? !infosec !security https://mblog.kavehmoravej.com/attachment/2821
kaveh's status on Friday, 16-Feb-2018 14:31:38 EST
What will the warrior-guardian of the future look like? !infosec !security https://mblog.kavehmoravej.com/attachment/2821
kaveh: 306 Million Freely Downloadable Pwned Passwords (SHA1 hashed) and how this data can be employed to do good things: https://www.troyhunt.com/introducing-306-million-freely-downloadable-pwned-passwords/ !security !infosec
kaveh's status on Friday, 04-Aug-2017 13:11:33 EDT
306 Million Freely Downloadable Pwned Passwords (SHA1 hashed) and how this data can be employed to do good things: https://www.troyhunt.com/introducing-306-million-freely-downloadable-pwned-passwords/ !security !infosec
bobjonkmanformer: ♻ @JimHarris: LOVE THIS Cartoon! Why Security & Privacy Are Essential Given The Explosion Of Data Today #BigData #infosec #CyberSecurity #SAPPHIRENOW https://cdn.andertoons.com/img/toons/cartoon6410.png ♻ via #Twitter !privacy
bobjonkmanformer's status on Sunday, 14-May-2017 15:16:42 EDT
♻ @JimHarris: LOVE THIS Cartoon! Why Security & Privacy Are Essential Given The Explosion Of Data Today #BigData #infosec #CyberSecurity #SAPPHIRENOW https://cdn.andertoons.com/img/toons/cartoon6410.png ♻ via #Twitter !privacy
Former Bob Jonkman -- Please use the new server at https://gs.jonkman.ca
cjbprime: RT @panther_modern Remote Command Execution #infosec https://t.co/SpOofQ2ckF
cjbprime's status on Friday, 06-Jan-2017 16:44:35 EST
RT @panther_modern Remote Command Execution #infosec https://t.co/SpOofQ2ckF
cjbprime: RT @x0rz The Mother of All Skimmers
cjbprime's status on Tuesday, 13-Dec-2016 19:21:47 EST
bobjonkman2: bobjonkman2 favorited something by meitar: Fabrication-Time Attacks on CPUs: Ken Thompson was right While the move to smaller transistors has been a boon for performance it has dramatically increased the cost to fabricate chips using those smaller transistors. This forces the vast majority of chip design companies to trust a third party—often overseas—to fabricate their design. To guard against shipping chips with errors (intentional or otherwise) chip design companies rely on post-fabrication testing. Unfortunately, this type of testing leaves the door open to malicious modifications since attackers can craft attack triggers requiring a sequence of unlikely events, which will never be encountered by even the most diligent tester. In this paper, we show how a fabrication-time attacker can leverage analog circuits to create a hardware attack that is small (i.e., requires as little as one gate) and stealthy (i.e., requires an unlikely trigger sequence before effecting a chip’s functionality). In the open spaces of an already placed and routed design, we construct a circuit that uses capacitors to siphon charge from nearby wires as they transition between digital values. When the capacitors fully charge, they deploy an attack that forces a victim flip-flop to a desired value. We weaponize this attack into a remotely-controllable privilege escalation by attaching the capacitor to a wire controllable and by selecting a victim flip-flop that holds the privilege bit for our processor. We implement this attack in an OR1200 processor and fabricate a chip. Experimental results show that our attacks work, show that our attacks elude activation by a diverse set of benchmarks, and suggest that our attacks evade known defenses. The only practical defense against something like this for a layperson is to rely on technology that doesn't yet exist: open source hardware combined with next-gen home 3d printing capabilities. I'd be surprised if this sort of attack isn't already part of the NSA's black budget. #surveillance #hardware #NSA #security #infosec
bobjonkman2's status on Wednesday, 25-May-2016 11:22:40 EDT
bobjonkman2 favorited something by meitar: Fabrication-Time Attacks on CPUs: Ken Thompson was right While the move to smaller transistors has been a boon for performance it has dramatically increased the cost to fabricate chips using those smaller transistors. This forces the vast majority of chip design companies to trust a third party—often overseas—to fabricate their design. To guard against shipping chips with errors (intentional or otherwise) chip design companies rely on post-fabrication testing. Unfortunately, this type of testing leaves the door open to malicious modifications since attackers can craft attack triggers requiring a sequence of unlikely events, which will never be encountered by even the most diligent tester. In this paper, we show how a fabrication-time attacker can leverage analog circuits to create a hardware attack that is small (i.e., requires as little as one gate) and stealthy (i.e., requires an unlikely trigger sequence before effecting a chip’s functionality). In the open spaces of an already placed and routed design, we construct a circuit that uses capacitors to siphon charge from nearby wires as they transition between digital values. When the capacitors fully charge, they deploy an attack that forces a victim flip-flop to a desired value. We weaponize this attack into a remotely-controllable privilege escalation by attaching the capacitor to a wire controllable and by selecting a victim flip-flop that holds the privilege bit for our processor. We implement this attack in an OR1200 processor and fabricate a chip. Experimental results show that our attacks work, show that our attacks elude activation by a diverse set of benchmarks, and suggest that our attacks evade known defenses. The only practical defense against something like this for a layperson is to rely on technology that doesn't yet exist: open source hardware combined with next-gen home 3d printing capabilities. I'd be surprised if this sort of attack isn't already part of the NSA's black budget. #surveillance #hardware #NSA #security #infosec
bobjonkman2: RT @meitar Fabrication-Time Attacks on CPUs: Ken Thompson was right While the move to smaller transistors has been a boon for performance it has dramatically increased the cost to fabricate chips using those smaller transistors. This forces the vast majority of chip design companies to trust a third party—often overseas—to fabricate their design. To guard against shipping ch https://n2.federati.net/notice/146808
bobjonkman2's status on Wednesday, 25-May-2016 11:22:37 EDT
RT @meitar Fabrication-Time Attacks on CPUs: Ken Thompson was right While the move to smaller transistors has been a boon for performance it has dramatically increased the cost to fabricate chips using those smaller transistors. This forces the vast majority of chip design companies to trust a third party—often overseas—to fabricate their design. To guard against shipping ch…
meitar: Fabrication-Time Attacks on CPUs: Ken Thompson was right While the move to smaller transistors has been a boon for performance it has dramatically increased the cost to fabricate chips using those smaller transistors. This forces the vast majority of chip design companies to trust a third party—often overseas—to fabricate their design. To guard against shipping chips with erro https://joindiaspora.com/p/7421446
meitar's status on Wednesday, 25-May-2016 11:16:45 EDT
Fabrication-Time Attacks on CPUs: Ken Thompson was right While the move to smaller transistors has been a boon for performance it has dramatically increased the cost to fabricate chips using those smaller transistors. This forces the vast majority of chip design companies to trust a third party—often overseas—to fabricate their design. To guard against shipping chips with erro…
mcscx: SwiftKey #exploit turns Samsung #Galaxy phones into remote bugging devices http://qttr.at/rgr (via @fefelonger) !android !infosec !security
mcscx's status on Wednesday, 17-Jun-2015 06:46:22 EDT
SwiftKey #exploit turns Samsung #Galaxy phones into remote bugging devices http://qttr.at/rgr (via @fefelonger) !android !infosec !security
lnxw48: RP @ignurante I agree. Better disable it: Using WPS on your Wi-Fi router may be even more dangerous than you think http://url.federati.net/9XDUp #infosec !security
lnxw48's status on Thursday, 04-Sep-2014 16:08:47 EDT
RP @ignurante I agree. Better disable it: Using WPS on your Wi-Fi router may be even more dangerous than you think http://url.federati.net/9XDUp #infosec !security
mcscx: #BadUSB "Why the !Security of USB Is Fundamentally Broken" http://qttr.at/dbt #infosec
mcscx's status on Saturday, 02-Aug-2014 16:45:08 EDT
#BadUSB "Why the !Security of USB Is Fundamentally Broken" http://qttr.at/dbt #infosec
netmackan: Do Government Websites Care About HTTPS? Not in 2010, wonder if it is better now? #ssl #tls !crypto #infosec https://t.co/id4ViuvhFk
netmackan's status on Monday, 28-Jul-2014 12:46:50 EDT
Do Government Websites Care About HTTPS? Not in 2010, wonder if it is better now? #ssl #tls !crypto #infosec https://t.co/id4ViuvhFk
netmackan: Don't like keys in memory. To bad it does not seem to be possible to configure #Apache HTTP Server to use a (soft) HSM. !crypto #infosec
netmackan's status on Saturday, 19-Jul-2014 11:48:32 EDT
Don't like keys in memory. To bad it does not seem to be possible to configure #Apache HTTP Server to use a (soft) HSM. !crypto #infosec
bobjonkmanformer: ♻ @TorontoCrypto: The quickest way to protect your web browsing habits: @EFF's own #HTTPSEverywhere. https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere #infosec !CryptoParty #encrypt
bobjonkmanformer's status on Saturday, 22-Mar-2014 16:12:25 EDT
♻ @TorontoCrypto: The quickest way to protect your web browsing habits: @EFF's own #HTTPSEverywhere. https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere #infosec !CryptoParty #encrypt
bobjonkmanformer: I'll give KeepassX another try, this time the v2alpha version https://www.keepassx.org/news/2013/12/420 !crypto !security !infosec
bobjonkmanformer's status on Monday, 17-Feb-2014 05:36:46 EST
I'll give KeepassX another try, this time the v2alpha version https://www.keepassx.org/news/2013/12/420 !crypto !security !infosec
bobjonkmanformer: The only time self-signed certificates are insecure is if you don't verify the certificate signature. It is always necessary to verify a certificate's signature out-of-band. Usually that's done by a Certificate Authority (with pre-defined CA certs bundled with the browser), but certificate signatures can also be verified through other secure channels, eg. In-person, GnuPG message, http://sn.jonkman.ca/notice/194748
bobjonkmanformer's status on Sunday, 09-Feb-2014 18:55:41 EST
The only time self-signed certificates are insecure is if you don't verify the certificate signature. It is always necessary to verify a certificate's signature out-of-band. Usually that's done by a Certificate Authority (with pre-defined CA certs bundled with the browser), but certificate signatures can also be verified through other secure channels, eg. In-person, GnuPG message, …
bobjonkmanformer: @Doctorow writes: "But there can be no real security in a world where it is illegal to tell people when the computers in their lives are putting them in danger. In other words, there can be no real security in a world where the DMCA and its global cousins are still intact." http://ur1.ca/gkuf9 !surveillance !infosec !security
bobjonkmanformer's status on Friday, 07-Feb-2014 16:43:47 EST
@Doctorow writes: "But there can be no real security in a world where it is illegal to tell people when the computers in their lives are putting them in danger. In other words, there can be no real security in a world where the DMCA and its global cousins are still intact." http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2014/feb/05/digital-rights-management !surveillance !infosec !security
bobjonkmanformer: Oh, and @atarifrosch, you should consider joining the !crypto, !surveillance, !security, and !infosec groups — you post about those topics often enough!
bobjonkmanformer's status on Monday, 27-Jan-2014 00:02:46 EST
Oh, and @atarifrosch, you should consider joining the !crypto, !surveillance, !security, and !infosec groups — you post about those topics often enough!
mcscx: "#NSA #infected 100,000 PCs around the world" http://qttr.at/bsl !surveillance !infosec !security
mcscx's status on Thursday, 16-Jan-2014 18:16:14 EST
"#NSA #infected 100,000 PCs around the world" http://qttr.at/bsl !surveillance !infosec !security
mcscx: @bardak schneier\.com Perhaps people like @qbi or @boneidol can recommend other sources. You might also sub to !infosec, !security, !privacy
mcscx's status on Monday, 13-Jan-2014 13:23:35 EST
@bardak schneier\.com Perhaps people like @qbi or @boneidol can recommend other sources. You might also sub to !infosec, !security, !privacy
erkanyilmaz: RT @mcscx ... Manufacturers affected from the DSL router #backdoor are SerComm (original manufacturer),Belkin,Cisco, Diamond, NetGear, Linksys, Level1
erkanyilmaz's status on Monday, 06-Jan-2014 17:19:36 EST
RT @mcscx ... Manufacturers affected from the DSL router #backdoor are SerComm (original manufacturer),Belkin,Cisco, Diamond, NetGear, Linksys, Level1
mcscx: ... Manufacturers affected from the DSL router #backdoor are SerComm (original manufacturer),Belkin,Cisco, Diamond, NetGear, Linksys, Level1
mcscx's status on Monday, 06-Jan-2014 17:16:40 EST
... Manufacturers affected from the DSL router #backdoor are SerComm (original manufacturer),Belkin,Cisco, Diamond, NetGear, Linksys, Level1
mcscx: @broniebrown thx for the link! #backdoor #linksys #cisco #netgear !infosec !security !privacy
mcscx's status on Friday, 03-Jan-2014 12:43:50 EST
@broniebrown thx for the link! #backdoor #linksys #cisco #netgear !infosec !security !privacy
eniac: Royal pardon for #codebreaker Alan #Turing http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25495315 !crypto !infosec
eniac's status on Tuesday, 24-Dec-2013 05:31:12 EST
Royal pardon for #codebreaker Alan #Turing http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25495315 !crypto !infosec
mcscx: @osbn ... Seems I should stop using RSA for SSH. Where else do we use RSA? !infosec !security !surveillance !ueberwachung #NSA #backdoor
mcscx's status on Saturday, 21-Dec-2013 06:34:06 EST
@osbn ... Seems I should stop using RSA for SSH. Where else do we use RSA? !infosec !security !surveillance !ueberwachung #NSA #backdoor
bobjonkmanformer: Twitter applies forward-secrecy http://ur1.ca/g7e3s !infosec !security !crypto
bobjonkmanformer's status on Monday, 16-Dec-2013 04:49:01 EST
Twitter applies forward-secrecy http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57613517-83/twitter-upping-security-to-thwart-government-hacking/ !infosec !security !crypto
bobjonkmanformer: The more Snowden saw of the NSA's actual business […] the more he realized that there were actually two governments: the one that was elected, and the other, secret regime, governing in the dark. http://ur1.ca/g6rki Excellent article! !surveillance !security !privacy !infosec
bobjonkmanformer's status on Saturday, 14-Dec-2013 02:04:49 EST
The more Snowden saw of the NSA's actual business […] the more he realized that there were actually two governments: the one that was elected, and the other, secret regime, governing in the dark. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204?print=true Excellent article! !surveillance !security !privacy !infosec
bobjonkmanformer: Better to use #DBAN to wipe a drive: http://ur1.ca/ale1h And on modern drives multiple passes don't really help to remove data http://ur1.ca/5cx7t On the other hand, Peter Gutmann says " By deliberately under-stating the requirements for media sanitization in publicly-available guides, intelligence agencies can preserve their information-gathering capabilities while at the same time http://sn.jonkman.ca/notice/65708
bobjonkmanformer's status on Saturday, 05-Oct-2013 14:00:51 EDT
Better to use #DBAN to wipe a drive: http://ur1.ca/ale1h And on modern drives multiple passes don't really help to remove data http://ur1.ca/5cx7t On the other hand, Peter Gutmann says " By deliberately under-stating the requirements for media sanitization in publicly-available guides, intelligence agencies can preserve their information-gathering capabilities while at the same time…
bobjonkmanformer: Advice from my friendly neighbourhood Federal Government: "Never “jailbreak”, or try to remove the limitations imposed by the manufacturer of your device. This could disable security measures of your mobile's OS, making you an easy target for a virus, worm or Trojan." http://ur1.ca/ftw94 !infosec
bobjonkmanformer's status on Thursday, 03-Oct-2013 23:54:55 EDT
Advice from my friendly neighbourhood Federal Government: "Never “jailbreak”, or try to remove the limitations imposed by the manufacturer of your device. This could disable security measures of your mobile's OS, making you an easy target for a virus, worm or Trojan." http://www.getcybersafe.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/tp-shts/hld2012-smrt-phn-eng.aspx !infosec
bobjonkmanformer: If NSA can crack 1024 bit RSA/DH encryption in Tor, are GnuPG 1024 bit keys also vulnerable? !crypto !infosec http://ur1.ca/ftenr
bobjonkmanformer's status on Wednesday, 02-Oct-2013 16:36:28 EDT
If NSA can crack 1024 bit RSA/DH encryption in Tor, are GnuPG 1024 bit keys also vulnerable? !crypto !infosec http://techcrunch.com/2013/09/07/the-nsa-can-read-some-encrypted-tor-traffic/
bobjonkmanformer: So DKIM is, in practice, useless. To misquote @csoghoian: [Unused] security can be a highly effective tool of the gov… https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/377935225663148032 !infosec
bobjonkmanformer's status on Thursday, 12-Sep-2013 16:40:57 EDT
So DKIM is, in practice, useless. To misquote @csoghoian: [Unused] security can be a highly effective tool of the gov… https://twitter.com/csoghoian/status/377935225663148032 !infosec
bobjonkmanformer: RT @mashable Little Girl Finds Security Flaw in iPhone 5S Fingerprint Scanner http://ur1.ca/fhmst !infosec via @chaslinux and @TEDchris
bobjonkmanformer's status on Wednesday, 11-Sep-2013 19:09:54 EDT
RT @mashable Little Girl Finds Security Flaw in iPhone 5S Fingerprint Scanner https://twitter.com/mashable/status/377834555501473793/photo/1 !infosec via @chaslinux and @TEDchris
metztli: Install !GNU/ !Linux !Gentoo into #encrypted root, /boot, & swap partitions http://t.co/1PZ7sd9q #LUKS ♺ @CyberCrimeNEWS #cyberwar #infosec
metztli's status on Friday, 18-Jan-2013 09:06:33 EST
Install !GNU/ !Linux !Gentoo into #encrypted root, /boot, & swap partitions http://t.co/1PZ7sd9q #LUKS ♺ @CyberCrimeNEWS #cyberwar #infosec
greve: ♻ @neirajones: 10 crazy IT security tricks that actually work http://t.co/QRm8boIz via @computerworld #infosec via @GarethBowker
greve's status on Monday, 09-Jul-2012 09:01:20 EDT
♻ @neirajones: 10 crazy IT security tricks that actually work http://t.co/QRm8boIz via @computerworld #infosec via @GarethBowker
eff: Computer security research at risk in European Parliament: https://eff.org/r.3ad6 #infosec
eff's status on Monday, 25-Jun-2012 16:23:01 EDT
Computer security research at risk in European Parliament: https://eff.org/r.3ad6 #infosec